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This paper shows (1) that the Spence-Dixit-Vives model of linear
demand for di⁄erentiated varieties is implied if supplies of substitutes
reduce individual consumers￿reservation prices as indicated in the pa-
per, (2) that for the micro-foundation-based version SDV demand and
endogenous sunk costs, the equilibrium number of varieties is indepen-
dent of the number of consumers in the market and the marginal cost
of a variety of unit quality, and (3) that with endogenous sunk cost,
if demand does not expand with the number of varieties (as in the
SDV model), the equilibrium number of varieties is unchanged, but
equilibrium qualities and quantities purchased are less, all else equal.
I am grateful for comments received at the Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven and the European University Institute. Responsibility for er-
rors is my own.
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21 Introduction
The linear aggregate demand product di⁄erentiation speci￿cation is widely
used in industrial economics. It is used by Sutton (1998 and elsewhere)
in his pathbreaking analysis of market structure. It is increasingly used
in the international trade literature. But it lacks micro foundations in a
speci￿cation of individual demand, of the kind that has been common since
Hotelling (1929).
Linear aggregate demand equations for di⁄erentiated products are typi-
cally either posited a priori or derived from a quadratic aggregate welfare
function. The quadratic aggregate welfare function is itself either simply as-
sumed or (less often) derived by aggregation from a population of individuals,
each of whom is assumed to have a quadratic welfare function of the same
type as the aggregate.
Strictly speaking, this speci￿cation has a long history in economics. Edge-
worth (1897, p. 26/1925, p. 122) uses a quadratic utility function and linear
inverse demand equations in discussion of complementary goods. Bowley
(1924, p. 56) uses a quadratic aggregate welfare function. He does not in-
clude among its arguments a composite good with constant marginal utility;
the implied demand equations are not linear. Despite these distinguished an-
tecedents, it is to Spence (1976) and Dixit (1979) that the modern economics
literature owes the linear demand for di⁄erentiated goods speci￿cation and
the observation that it can be derived from a quadratic representative con-
sumer welfare function. One might also highlight Singh and Vives (1984).
H￿ckner (2000), who allows for many varieties and quality di⁄erences, pro-
vides what is probably the most complete generalization of Dixit (1979).1
Clear micro foundations have the merit of making explicit the assump-
tions about individual demand that stand behind a model of aggregate de-
mand (Kirman, 1992). In this paper I outline a way to derive the quadratic
aggregate welfare function from a model of individual demand,2 and use the
resulting speci￿cation to model the equilibrium number of ￿rms in quantity-
setting oligopoly with exogenous and alternatively endogenous sunk cost per
1For a review of the speci￿cation, see Vives (1999). Pinkse and Slade (2002, 2004)
approximate a general individual indirect utility function by a quadratic functional form
that aggregates to a demand equation that is linear in prices. Foster et al. (2008) use a
quadratic aggregate welfare function that allows for a continuum of varieties.
2That is, from a model of individual demand that is not the aggregate relationship writ
small.
3variety.
In Section 2 I review the derivation from micro foundations of a linear ag-
gregate demand function for the case of a homogeneous product. In Section
3 I show how to generalize this derivation from micro foundations to obtain
linear aggregate demand functions for varieties of a di⁄erentiated product
class. In Section 4 I relate Cournot oligopoly equilibrium, considering alter-
natively the cases of exogenous and endogenous sunk costs, to parameters
describing individual demand characteristics. I examine two demand spec-
i￿cations, that of Spence-Dixit-Vives and a modi￿cation that corresponds,
in a sense made precise below, to that of Shubik and Levitan (1980). The
nature of the demand-parameter, equilibrium number of varieties relation-
ship di⁄ers fundamentally between the exogenous and endogenous sunk cost
cases. Section 5 concludes. Terse derivations of results are in the Appendix;
a detailed Appendix with full proofs is available on request from the author.
2 Linear Demand, Homogeneous Product
In preparation for what follows, I review the standard derivation of a linear
market demand curve for a homogeneous product from the micro behavior
of a continuous mass of N consumers, each consumer purchasing either ￿ or
zero units of the good.3 Let x denote a consumer￿ s reservation price for the
good, suppose that x is uniformly distributed on the interval 0 ￿ x ￿ ￿,4
and refer to a consumer who obtains utility x from consuming one unit of
the good as ￿the consumer at x.￿ Then if a consumer at x purchases one
unit of the product at price p, that consumer obtains net utility x ￿ p. If
all consumers have su¢ cient income to purchase the product, should they










for 0 ￿ p ￿ ￿ and 0 for p ￿ ￿. ￿N is the quantity demanded at price 0. At
price p, the N
￿ p consumers with reservation prices between zero and p do not
3This aspect of the speci￿cation is discussed in Section 3.3.2.
4The assumption that reservation prices are uniformly distributed recommends itself
for the simplicity of the results it brings. See Schmalensee (1984) for an early analysis of
a normal distribution of reservation prices.
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Figure 1: Linear market demand curve, homogeneous product.
purchase the good, and the remaining N ￿ N
￿ p consumers purchase ￿ units
each.
From (1) one obtains the inverse demand equation




the graph of which is shown in Figure 1. The slope coe¢ cient, ￿=￿N, is the
inverse of the uniform density of quantity demanded by reservation prices.
The inverse demand equation can alternatively be derived by maximizing
an aggregate or representative consumer welfare function that is quadratic
in Q and linear in a constant marginal utility Hicksian ￿all other goods￿or
￿money,￿M, the price of which is normalized to be 1,







subject to the budget constraint
pQ + M = Y; (4)
taking the solution with M > 0.
53 Linear Demand, Horizontal Product Dif-
ferentiation
In Section 3.1, limiting myself for simplicity to the case of two varieties, I
give a standard form of linear inverse demand equations with di⁄erentiated
varieties and show how it can be derived from a modi￿ed version of the
individual behavior that underlies equation (1). In Section 3.3 I introduce
asymmetries in the maximum reservation price and quantity purchased per
consumer.
3.1 Symmetric Duopoly
Generalizing the notation of the previous section, for the duopoly case, linear
inverse demand equations for horizontally di⁄erentiated goods are
p1 = ￿ ￿
￿
￿N
(q1 + ￿q2); (5)
p2 = ￿ ￿
￿
￿N
(￿q1 + q2): (6)
Here ￿, N, and ￿ are as in the homogeneous product case. At the aggregate
level, it is customary to interpret ￿ as a product di⁄erentiation parameter.
An alternative aggregate interpretation, and a micro interpretation, will be
presented below.
If ￿ = 1, the varieties are perfect substitutes; if ￿ = 0, the varieties are
independent in demand; and if ￿ < 0, the varieties are demand complements.
It is natural to use such a speci￿cation to model quantity-setting oligopoly.5
Spence (1976, footnote 6) notes that total surplus for linear aggregate
5For equivalent speci￿cations that are in some ways better suited for models of price-
setting oligopoly, see Shubik and Levitan (1980, p. 69), Vives (1985).
6inverse demand equations of the form (5), (6) is6













Then as is well known, and by analogy with the homogeneous product
case, the aggregate inverse demand equations (5) and (6) can be derived by
maximizing the aggregate welfare function













subject to the budget constraint
Y = M + p1q1 + p2q2: (10a)
3.2 Micro Foundations
The aggregate inverse demand equations (5) and (6) can alternatively be
derived from individual behavior as follows. Let there be N consumers po-
tentially in the market for varieties 1 and 2. Consumers￿maximum reserva-
tion prices are uniformly distributed, with density N=￿, along the interval
0 ￿ x ￿ ￿. Now assume that if qj units of good j are on the market, the
reservation price for good i of a consumer at x is x ￿ ￿
￿
￿Nqj, provided the
latter is nonnegative, and zero otherwise. Intuitively, if apples are plentiful,
consumers are willing to pay less for oranges, all else equal, and vice versa.












6He also remarks, in his footnote 6 (simplifying to the case of two varieties and using





























so that for a class of di⁄erentiated goods, aggregate gross welfare is not the sum of the
areas under the demand curves, but rather the sum under the areas under curves derived
from the demand curves by suitably adjusting price-axis intercepts.
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Figure 2: Linear market demand curve, variety 1, horizontal product di⁄er-
entiation.
This leads to (5) and (6); the demand curve for variety 1 is illustrated in
Figure 2. At the micro level, ￿ indicates the extent to which the availability
of substitute varieties lowers a consumer￿ s reservation price.
3.3 Asymmetries
In the previous section, all varieties have the same maximum reservation price
￿, and each consumer purchases the same quantity (￿) of every variety, if the
variety is purchased at all. For many purposes (modelling vertical product
di⁄erentiation, for example, or examining the impact of changes in market
size on the equilibrium number of ￿rms), it is useful to extend the model to
permit di⁄erences across varieties in these aspects of consumer demand.
3.3.1 Di⁄erent reservation prices
We begin with di⁄erent maximum reservation prices for di⁄erent varieties,
keeping other aspects of demand the same for all varieties. Limiting ourselves
for expositional purposes to the duopoly case, if the maximum reservation
price is the same for both varieties, demand for variety i is given by (11).
If there are di⁄erent maximum reservation prices for di⁄erent varieties, a









for some function f (￿1;￿2). f should satisfy f (￿;￿) = ￿, so (12) reduces to
(11) if ￿1 = ￿2. Since nothing fundamental changes if varieties are renum-



















































3.3.2 Di⁄erent quantities per consumer
At this point a word on the role of the parameter ￿ is in order. It would
be usual, and in discussion of the homogeneous-product case would raise no
di¢ culty of interpretation, to assume that there are N potential consumers,
each of whom takes either one or zero units of a good. Then one way in
which market size can change is a change in N. In the speci￿cation used
here, the quantity that would be demanded if price were zero is ￿N, and
it is a change in ￿N that is one kind of change in market size. The micro
foundation for the linear product di⁄erentiation model proposed in equation
(11) makes consumer reservation prices for a variety a declining function of
the quantities of substitute varieties. Although the mathematical formula-
tion does not require it, a natural economic interpretation is that it is one
and the same N consumers who are potential purchasers of all varieties. The
9parameter ￿ (which generalizes to ￿i in the asymmetric case) makes it pos-
sible to model changes in market size in the sense of changing the maximum
possible quantity demanded, holding N constant.7
If the maximum individual quantity purchased of di⁄erent varieties may


















By the arguments made about f (￿1;￿2) in the previous section, g (￿1;￿2)































respectively. The corresponding aggregate welfare function is



















3.3.3 An Encompassing Speci￿cation





























7All results presented here for di⁄erences in ￿ across varieties are replicated if ￿ is
set equal to 1 and it is di⁄erences in N that are considered. Further, having worked out
formulation considered in the paper, it is straightforward to generalize the model so that
total demand for (say) variety 1 is the sum of demand by one group of consumers for
whom other varieties are substitutes and another group of consumers who purchase, if at
all, only variety 1.
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Figure 3: Linear market demand curve, variety 1, asymmetric maximum
reservation prices, asymmetric quantities demanded per consumer.
from which follow inverse demand and quadratic aggregate welfare equations









































The demand curve for variety 1 is drawn in Figure 3. ￿1 is the maxi-
mum reservation price if the substitute good is not available, ￿1 the quantity
demanded per consumer, and ￿1N the maximum quantity demanded. For
reservation price parameter ￿, with quantity q2 of the substitute variety avail-








zero, whichever is greater.
In what follows I will work with generalizations of the encompassing spec-
i￿cation from duopoly to oligopoly.
114 Market Size and the Equilibrium Number
of Firms
Here I examine the relation between micro demand parameters and the equi-
librium number of ￿rms in quantity-setting oligopoly. I ￿rst consider the
n-￿rm generalization of the variety of the duopoly speci￿cation (23), then
a modi￿cation in which (in a certain sense) market size is constant as the
number of varieties changes. In symmetric oligopoly with exogenous sunk
cost per variety, the equilibrium number of ￿rms is related to a measure of
market size that emerges from the analysis, a measure that depends on ￿,
￿, and marginal cost. If variety-speci￿c values of ￿ and ￿ are endogenized,
along the lines of Sutton (1998), the equilibrium number of ￿rms depends on
cost parameters and ￿. For reasons of tractability, I consider cases in which
each ￿rm produces one variety.8
4.1 Exogenous sunk cost








dx = ￿N ￿ ￿Q￿i ￿
￿N
￿




qj is the combined output of all varieties except that of
variety i, one obtains an n-￿rm version of the symmetric duopoly inverse
demand equations (5)/(6):
pi = ￿ ￿
￿
￿N
(qi + ￿Q￿i): (26)
Let F be ￿xed and sunk cost per variety and constant marginal cost per
8Extensions of the models developed here to the case of multiple varieties per ￿rm lack
analytical solutions.
12unit ￿c per unit.9 Firm￿ s i￿ s single-period payo⁄ and objective function, is
￿i =
￿





q1 ￿ F: (27)
The ￿rst-order condition,10 which can be written
2qi + ￿Q￿i ￿ (1 ￿ c)￿N; (28)









2 ￿ F; (29)
with an asterisk denoting an equilibrium value.




2 + (n ￿ 1)￿
￿N; (30)














[2 + (n ￿ 1)￿]







is a natural measure of market size. It is consumer surplus in a market
with inverse demand equation p = ￿ ￿
￿
￿Nq if price equals marginal cost,
or equivalently the pro￿t of a single supplier that can costlessly engage in
￿rst-degree price discrimination.
If the number of ￿rms adjusts so pro￿t per ￿rm equals zero, we obtain11
9In this section, writing constant marginal cost as ￿c is merely a normalization. When
we move on to the case of endogenous sunk cost, we interpret ￿ as a measure of quality,
and the assumption that the marginal cost of a variety of quality ￿ is ￿c is the assumption
that marginal cost is proportional to quality. One might expect constant marginal cost
to increase more than proportionately to quality, and the speci￿cation employed here is
chosen on the usual ground that it permits analytic solutions.
10The second-order condition is met.
11This ignores the fact that the number of ￿rms must be an integer. See Amir and
Lambson (2000, 2007) for consideration of this point.
13Result 1: With exogenous sunk cost F per variety, constant mar-
ginal cost ￿c per unit, and aggregate demand (26), the long-run
Cournot oligopoly equilibrium number of ￿rms is
n




















for S given by (32).
The condition for it to be pro￿table for at least one ￿rm to supply the
market is S ￿ 2F. The individual demand characteristics ￿ and ￿ a⁄ect
equilibrium pro￿t (and therefore the long-run equilibrium number of ￿rms)
only via their e⁄ects on S. S rises as ￿ and ￿N rise, and as c falls, as therefore
does n￿. n￿ rises as ￿ and F fall. All these results are what one would expect
with exogenous sunk costs.
4.2 Endogenous sunk cost
In this section, we consider a two-stage game. In the second stage, ￿rms
compete as quantity-setting oligopolists, with the maximum reservation price
￿i and quantity demanded per consumer ￿i of each variety given. In the ￿rst
stage, there is simultaneous entry of the zero-pro￿t number of ￿rms. Each
￿rm noncooperatively makes ￿xed and sunk investments that determine the
￿ and ￿ values of its variety. When it makes these investments, the ￿rm
anticipates the consequences of its choices for its second stage payo⁄.
4.2.1 Demand, asymmetric Cournot oligopoly
























































Firm i￿ s second period objective function ￿ which is gross of sunk costs
























The ￿rst-order condition to maximize (36) implies that ￿rm i￿ s equilib-










It is shown in the Appendix that
Result 2: For single product ￿rms and aggregate inverse demand





(2 ￿ ￿)[2 + (n ￿ 1)￿]
(












Let " denote the ￿xed and sunk cost of designing a variety with ￿ = 1, and ￿
the ￿xed and sunk cost of marketing a variety with ￿ = 1. Suppose further
that the ￿xed cost of quality rises exponentially at rate ￿ > 2, and the ￿xed
cost of increasing quantity purchased rises exponentially at rate ￿ > 2.13






12These inverse demand equations are valid provided all quantities demanded are non-
negative, and we limit our attention to such cases. The condition for a variety to have
nonnegative quantity demanded, in Cournot equilibrium, depends on the market sizes (in
the sense of (32)) of all varieties and on ￿.
13This is the formulation Sutton (1998, p. 59) uses for a ￿rm with a single choice variable.
As Sutton explains in the context of his model, the assumption that the exponents are
greater than 2 ensures that ￿xed cost rises (here, with ￿, ￿) at least as rapidly as pro￿t.
15A ￿rm can increase maximum reservation prices for its variety, given the
quantity an individual consumer will purchase if the consumer purchases at
all. A ￿rm can increase the quantity a consumer with a given maximum
reservation price will buy, if the consumer buys at all, given the consumer￿ s
maximum reservation price. By way of interpretation, one can think of "￿
￿
i as
product design (or R&D) costs that determine the quality of the variety, while
￿￿
￿
i is marketing (or advertising) costs that a⁄ect purchase amounts, given
quality. Firms face increasing costs of product design and of marketing.14















i given by (38).
It is shown in the Appendix that
Theorem 3: (a) for given n, equilibrium ￿, ￿, and market size
S = 1








2 + (n ￿ 2)￿
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(b) the equilibrium number of varieties is
n
￿ = 1 +
2 ￿ ￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 1
￿ + ￿
> 1; (44)
equilibrium values of ￿, ￿, and and S satisfy
￿
(￿￿1)(￿￿1)￿1
￿ = (1 ￿ c)
2 N
￿￿ (￿ + ￿)







14In a more general formulation, the two types of costs might be related.
16￿
(￿￿1)(￿￿1)￿1
￿ = (1 ￿ c)
2 N
￿￿ (￿ + ￿)
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Sutton (1998, p. 46) illustrates his general analysis of the determinants
of market structure with an example in which every consumer in a market
has a quadratic utility function. In this framework, markets grow larger as
the number of consumers increases. As the number of consumers increases,
variety-speci￿c aggregate demand curves rotate in a counterclockwise direc-
tion around the maximum reservation price that is common to all consumers.
In this framework, Sutton looks for (Section 1.2) and ￿nds the result that
concentration is bounded away from zero as market size increases.
Here consumers di⁄er in reservation prices, and varieties di⁄er potentially
both in terms of the maximum reservation price and the quantity a consumer
will buy, if the consumer buys at all (demand characteristics that depend on
￿rms￿sunk investments). ￿ and ", ￿ and ￿ are parameters that determine
the cost to a ￿rm of getting a higher ￿ or a larger ￿. In the context of the
present model, it is N and c that parametrically a⁄ect market size.15 The
speci￿c manifestation of Sutton￿ s lower bound on concentration that appears
as (44) is that the equilibrium number of ￿rms is invariant to changes in N
and c.
From (44), the equilibrium number of ￿rms falls as reservation prices are









￿2 < 0; (48)













15But, as regards N, see footnote 7.













4.3 ￿Constant Market Size￿
There is a sense16 in which the Spence-Dixit-Vives speci￿cation implies that
market size increases with the number of varieties. To see this, consider the
total number of units demanded, as implied by (26), if all ￿rms set the same
price. Since the quantity demanded of a single variety at equal prices is
q =
1




the total number of units demanded17 is
nq =
n























(for 0 < ￿ < 1).
This leads to the alternative interpretation of ￿ that is referred to at
the start of Section 3.1: in the Spence-Dixit-Vives speci￿cation, the inverse
of ￿ measures the expandability of the market as the number of varieties
increases, all else equal.
4.3.1 Shubik-Levitan
For the Spence-Dixit-Vives speci￿cation, the total number of units demanded
at a common price increases as the number of varieties increases. This mar-
ket expansion e⁄ect is not inherent in linear aggregate demand models of
product di⁄erentiation. Shubik and Levitan (1980) put forward an alterna-
tive aggregate linear demand, di⁄erentiated product speci￿cation in which
16As I have earlier (Martin, 1985) observed.
17This sum should be interpreted in the sense n1 apples plus n2 oranges add to n1 +n2
pieces of fruit.
18total demand at identical prices is constant with respect to changes in the
number of varieties.





[￿ ￿ ￿pi ￿ ￿￿(pi ￿ p)]: (54)
















Comparing (26) and (55), for a given number of varieties, the SDV and
SL speci￿cations are equivalent for18
￿ =
n









In the Shubik-Levitan speci￿cation, it is ￿ that indicates the extent of
product di⁄erentiation. From (54), ￿varieties￿are completely independent
in demand if ￿ = 0. From (57), ￿ = 0 corresponds to ￿ = 0 in the SDV
speci￿cation. Also from (54), varieties approach perfect substitutability in
the SL speci￿cation as ￿ ! 1,19 and this corresponds to ￿ = 1 in the SDV
speci￿cation.
For present purposes, however, it su¢ ces to note that if all varieties charge
the same price p (which is a characteristic of symmetric equilibrium), the
quantity demanded (q) will be the same for all varieties, and (54) simpli￿es
to
nq = ￿ ￿ ￿p; (59)
the right-hand side of which is independent of n. In the Shubik-Levitan
model, in contrast to the SDV speci￿cation, for a common price, the total
number of units demanded is independent of the number of varieties.
18Derivations are straightforward and available on request from the author.
19Alternatively, this may be seen by rewriting (54) as
pi ￿ p =
1
￿￿
[￿ ￿ ￿pi ￿ nqi]: (58)
As ￿ ! 1, the right-hand side goes to zero; as varieties approach perfect substitutability,
there is less and less leeway for the price of any variety to deviate from the industry average
price.
194.3.2 Scaled-demand SDV
From (52), in the Spence-Dixit-Vives speci￿cation, the total number of units
demanded, at a common price, is proportional to n
1+(n￿1)￿. A constant-
market-size version of the SDV speci￿cation can be obtained by scaling de-
mand equations by








(1 ￿ ￿) < 1: (60)
Linear demand equations that exhibit constant market size in this sense
can be obtained from microfoundations by assuming that a single consumer￿ s








￿ < ￿. The aggregate demand equation for variety
i (for the symmetric parameter case) becomes,
qi =











leading to inverse demand equations of the form20
pi = ￿ ￿
n











4.3.3 Exogenous sunk cost
If ￿xed cost is exogenously determined and demand is scaled as indicated





(1 ￿ c)￿ ￿
n












i ￿ F: (64)






1 + (n ￿ 1)￿
n
(1 ￿ c)￿N; (65)




















￿ ; the total number of
units demanded at a common price, nqs
i = ￿N
￿￿p
￿ , is independent of n.











2 ￿ F: (66)
If the number of ￿rms ns takes the value that makes symmetric equilib-






s [2 + (n
s ￿ 1)￿]
2 : (67)
Analysis of the analytic solution to (67) is uninformative. A simple argu-
ment, however, veri￿es the expected result, that ns < n￿ (where n￿ is given




(n ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
n
2S
[2 + (n ￿ 1)￿]
2 > 0: (68)
Hence for the value of n that makes ￿s = 0, ￿rms in an otherwise identical
market with unscaled demand earn positive pro￿t.
4.3.4 Endogenous sunk cost
Second-stage equilibrium Model endogenous sunk cost above. If de-
mand equations are scaled so the total number of units demanded at a con-
stant price is independent of the number of varieties, ￿rm i￿ s second period
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21Equilibrium second-stage outputs are given by21
Result 4: For single product ￿rms and aggregate inverse demand





1 + (n ￿ 1)￿

















First-stage equilibrium It is shown in the Appendix that
Theorem 5: For single product ￿rms and aggregate inverse
demand equations scaled as indicated above,
(a) the equilibrium number of varieties is the same as for the
Spence-Dixit-Vives speci￿cation;


















(1 ￿ ￿) < 1;
(74)
where ￿ and ￿ are given by Theorem 3;
(c) and market size Ss = 1



















where S is given by Theorem 3.
It is for this reason that the heading of this section (￿Constant Market
Size￿ ) is in quotation marks. With endogenous sunk costs, market size is












1 + (n ￿ 1)￿
n
N (1 ￿ c)col￿i: (72)
Solution gives (73). Details are contained in an Appendix that is available on request from
the author.
22endogenous. By investing in product design and advertising, ￿rms in￿ uence
reservation prices and quantities demanded, and this holds whether or not
the total number of units demanded, at a common price, varies with the
number of varieties or not. With exogenous sunk cost, if the total number
of units demanded at a common price is independent of the number of vari-
eties, the result is a smaller equilibrium number of varieties, relative to the
Spence-Dixit-Vives speci￿cation. With endogenous sunk cost, the long-run
equilibrium number of varieties is the same with either speci￿cation, but equi-
librium market size, maximum reservation prices, and quantities demanded
per consumer are smaller for demand scaled in the Shubik-Levitan manner.
5 Conclusion
This paper makes three contributions. One is to show that the Spence-Dixit-
Vives model is implied if supplies of substitutes reduce individual consumers￿
reservation prices as indicated in Section 3.2. The second is to show that for
the micro-foundation-based version SDV demand explored here and endoge-
nous sunk costs, the equilibrium number of varieties is independent of the
number of consumers in the market and the marginal cost of a variety of
unit quality. Instead, the equilibrium number of varieties depends on the
way endogenous sunk costs vary with quality and individual quantity de-
manded, and with the way reservation prices are a⁄ected by the availability
of substitute varieties. The third is to show that with endogenous sunk cost,
if (in contrast to the SDV model) demand does not expand with the number
of varieties, the equilibrium number of varieties is unchanged from the SDV
model, but equilibrium qualities and quantities purchased are less, compared
with the expandable demand case.
236 Appendix
6.1 Derivation of Result 2














qj ￿ (1 ￿ c)N￿i: (76)























where Jn is a column vector of 1s. Taking advantage of the known inverse of




















and for a single variety, this gives (38).
6.2 Derivation of Theorem 3






(2 ￿ ￿)[2 + (n ￿ 1)￿]
￿2
: (80)

























































[2 + (n ￿ 2)￿]￿1
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2 + (n ￿ 2)￿
￿1
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Using (82) and (83), the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to ￿1 and
￿1can be written
K [2 + (n ￿ 2)￿]
(














K￿1 [2 + (n ￿ 2)￿]
(















In symmetric equilibrium, (84) and (85) imply
"￿










These can be solved for (41) and (42), which in turn imply (43).
Symmetric equilibrium pro￿t per ￿rm is




25Substituting (86) and (87) in (88) gives
￿ = K￿￿(2 ￿ ￿)
￿









from which (44) follows. Other statements in the theorem follow substituting
this expression for n￿ in expressions in intermediate parts of the derivation,
and simplifying the resulting expressions.
6.3 Derivation of Theorem 5
For notational compactness, write
K
s =












Then ￿rm 1￿ s objective function has the form (81), substituting Ks for K.
That the equilibrium number of ￿rms is the same as implied by Theorem 3
follows from this. The equilibrium values of ￿s, ￿s, Ss also follow; details are
in an Appendix available on request from the author.
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